We complement the rich conceptual work on organizational corruption by quantitatively modeling the spread of corruption within organizations. We systematically vary four organizational culture-related parameters, i.e., organization structure, location of bad apple, employees' propensity to become corrupted ("corruption probability"), and number of whistle-blowers. Our simulation studies find that in organizations with flatter structures, corruption permeates the organization at a lower threshold value of corruption probability compared to those with taller structures. However, the final proportion of corrupted individuals is higher in the latter as compared to the former. Also, we find that for a 1,000 strong organization, 5% of the workforce is a critical threshold in terms of the number of whistle-blowers needed to constrain the spread of corruption, and if this number I s around 25%, the corruption contagion is negligible. Implications of our results are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a spate of work on organizational corruption in general, and on the organizational contagion processes that result in corruption getting normalized or institutionalized in particular (Ashforth & Anand 2003; Brief, Buttram, & Dukerich, 2001; Darley 2005; Moore 2009; Pinto, Leana, & Pil, 2008) . Although this work has identified a variety of mechanisms through which corruption could spread across an organization, quantitative studies of these dynamics and their consequences have been relatively neglected.
In parallel, there has been a wealth of quantitative studies about diffusion in general and contagion in particular (Dodds & Watts 2005) which have investigated the spread of, inter alia, fads and fashions (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992; Hirsh 1972) (Lee & Pennings 2002) , and civil service procedures (Tolbert & Zucker 1983) , among others, across a variety of units and levels of analyses, e.g., individuals (Bikhchandani et al. 1992; Hirsh 1972) , organizations (Abrahamson & Fairchild 1999) , industry (Lee & Pennings 2002) , cities across a State (Tolbert & Zucker 1983) , and States of a country (Goel & Nelson 2007) . However, intra-organizational contagion has been relatively neglected.
Our paper is at the intersection of these two literature streams because we quantitatively model corruption contagion within organizations. Although there has been substantial conceptual and qualitative exposition of the social contagion processes that result in organizations becoming corrupt, there has been almost no quantitative work on this subject (see Chang & Lai 2002 for an exception). For instance, Pinto et al. (2008: 688) conceptualize an organization of corrupt individuals as one that results when personally corrupt behaviors cross a critical threshold but they do not precisely define the threshold at which the phenomenon escalates from the individual-level to the organization-level. They follow Andersson and Pearson (1999) who suggest that when the number of incivility spirals reach a critical threshold it may result in "uncivil" organization, again without quantifying the threshold or tipping point.
We bridge this gap by quantitatively modeling the dynamics of corruption spreading in organizations to investigate the following questions: What is the critical threshold in terms of corruption probability (i.e., employees' propensity to be corrupted) which, once crossed, will result in the entire organization being corrupted?; What are the evolution or contagion dynamics of corruption from a single bad apple to an organization-wide phenomenon?; What proportion of the organization should be potential whistle-blowers to prevent it from being corrupted? Our developed model is general and is applicable to any organizational structure but as a first step, we investigate its dynamics on purely hierarchical organizational networks, considering both tall and flat structures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we develop an stochastic model for corruption dynamics in organizations. In section III perform expensive Monte
Carlo simulation of our model on set of purely hierarchical organizational networks, and describes results the dynamics of corruption spreading, the corruption threshold, and the impact of organizational hierarchy and the presence of whistle-blowers on the corruption spreading. We conclude this paper in Section IV with a discussions of the implications of our finding for the practice and observations on future work.
II. MODELLING CORRUPTION CONTAGION

II.1 Phenomenology
Contagion is defined as the spreading of an entity or influence between individuals in a population via direct or indirect contact (Dodds & Watts 2005) and social contagion (Goldstone & Janssen, 2005: 427) is defined as "the spread of an entity or influence between individuals in a population via interactions between agents. Examples are the spreading of fads, rumors, and riots." In this paper we focus on one form of social contagion; the spread of a corrupt practice. Corruption is generally defined as the misuse of a position of authority for private or personal benefit (Shleifer & Vishny 1993) . In this paper, one of our key objectives is to derive a point-estimate of the "critical threshold" (Andersson & Pearson 1999; Pinto et al. 2008 ), or "tipping point" (Gladwell 2000 , which when breached results in the corrupt practices effectively pervading the entire organization. Identifying the critical threshold is important because once corruption pervades an organization, the organization will almost certainly decay and die, resulting in enormous social and economic costs. We bound our paper around the definition of organization of corrupt individuals (Pinto et al. 2008: 688) , which is "an emergent, bottom-up phenomenon in which one or more mesoscale processes facilitate the contagion (and sometimes the initiation as well) of personally corrupt behaviors that cross a critical threshold such that the organization can be characterized as corrupt."
For corrupt practices to diffuse widely within an organization, the organizational culture would necessarily be complicit. We therefore include four key organizational-culture related parameters in our simulation studies. Our modeling parameters include organization structure, bad apples, individuals' propensity to be corrupted, and whistle-blowers.
Organization structure: Corruption could permeate both through proximity, and aspects like interdependent relationships and mentoring programs both vertically and horizontally.
With regard to vertical corruption contagion, Bovasso (1996) found that individual adoption of attitudes and behaviors is influenced by those who have power over them, and this could result in crimes of obedience (Hamilton & Sanders 1999) . With regard to horizontal corruption, Greve (1995: 450) states that "in a decentralized organization with many decision-making nodes, horizontal contact among decision makers within the organization is likely and can lead to contagion of practices within the organization." Both forms of contagion could co-exist and reinforce each other. Jones and Kavanagh (1996) According to Greve (1995) , a theoretical interest pioneered by network studies is that the location of actors in a social structure leads to heterogeneity in contagion (Burt 1987; Galaskiewicz & Burt 1991; Marsden & Friedkin 1993; Strang & Tuma 1993) . For instance, centrality in the information structure causes higher susceptibility to contagion (Coleman et al. 1966) . In a branching network (i.e., organization structure) it is obvious that the higher the bad apple is located in the hierarchy, the greater the likelihood, speed, and pervasiveness of corruption throughout the organization. However, the differential impact of the bad apple being at various levels of the hierarchy is not clear, especially across organizations of differing heights/breadths. Thus we model the time evolution of corruption that emanates from a single bad apple with regard to the hierarchical level at which it is located.
Propensity to become corrupted (or "corruption probability"): In order for corruption to spread in an organization the presence of bad apples is necessary but not sufficient. It is also required that the rest of the organization must be influenceable and adopt the corrupt practice. Following research in personality psychology, we take the view that individuals differ in their propensity to be influenced. One of the key personality constructs that has influenceability at its core is self-monitoring. Self-monitoring is the extent to which a person observes their own expressive behavior and adapts it to the demands of the situation to become corrupted as a probability ("corruption probability").
Number of whistle-blowers:
Although diffusion and contagion studies usually focus on the take-up and spreading, rather than on the inhibition and dropping-off (Strang & Macy 2001) , in this paper we also include an inhibitory factor, i.e., whistle-blowing. Whistleblowing is an important antidote to corporate corruption (Boyle 1990; Paul & Townsend 1996) . Near and Miceli define whistleblowing as "the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate organizational acts or omissions to parties who can take action to correct the wrongdoing" (1985: 4). Thus if an employee who is a whistle-blower becomes aware that a corrupt practice is being engaged in, he or she would blow the whistle and the contagion would be arrested. We do not specify whether the whistle is blown anonymously or not (Nayir & Herzig, 2011) .
II.2 Mathematical Model
We follow the standard assumption in all mathematical models of contagion that the infection probability is independent and identical across successive contacts ( and, (2) a mathematical formulation of the phenomenology of corruption spreading. In the following each of these components are described.
The model described below is adapted from the rumor-spreading work by Nekovee et al. (2006) and is an attempt to formalize and simplify the behavioral mechanisms in terms of a set of simple but plausible rules. In formal rumor-spreading models (Daley & Kendal 1965; Maki 1973; Nekovee et al. 2006) , a closed population is subdivided into three groups; those who are ignorant of the rumor ("ignorants"), those who have heard it and actively spread it ("spreaders"), and those who have heard the rumor but have ceased to spread it ("stiflers").
Early work on modeling rumor spreading (Daley & Kendal 1965; Maki 1973 ) assumed a homogeneously mixed population where every individual can contact every other individual in the population, an approximation which is appropriate when the population is relatively small. Nekovee et al. (2006) extend the model to the case where contacts can only take place along the links of an underlying social network. We adapt this approach to corruptionspreading models in which an organizationally bounded population of individuals is initially subdivided into two groups; those who are ignorant of the corrupt practice ("innocents"), and those who are engaging in the corrupt behavior ("corruptors") and attempt to spread it via the organizational contact network. We assume that there are already some corrupt individuals, following previous work (e.g., Blanchard, Krueger, & Krueger, 2005) showing that corruption rarely emerges out of nothing, but it is usually related to some already corrupt individuals or environment which may "infect" the susceptibles.
In our models, the susceptibles or innocents, as we term them, may become corruptionaware by direct interaction with corruptors. On becoming corruption-aware, the innocents could respond in one of three ways: (1) get infected (i.e., they adopt the corrupt practice as well), and thus become "corruptors" (i.e., they could further spread the corruption to other innocents through direct interaction and indirectly by being observed); or, (2) do not get infected, and are termed "uprights" because though no longer innocent (i.e., they are aware of the corrupt practice), they do not adopt the corrupt practice; or, (3) blow the whistle, and are termed "whistle-blowers", who on becoming corruption-aware report the wrongdoing to the authorities who effectively stop the corrupt practice. The whistle-blowing process in reality is never this simple (Vandekerchkove & Lewis, 2011) or this effective (e.g., Near & Miceli 1996) , and would depend on numerous situational factors (Robinson et al. 2011) . We are making this simplifying assumption for the purposes of our modeling. We assume that upon the reporting of a corrupt individual by a whistle-blower, the corrupt individual is immediately removed from the organization and replaced by an upright member. This approach also resonates with the business ethics literature. For instance, Zyglidopoulos and Fleming (2007) also parse individuals into innocents (bystanders and participants), corrupted (active rationalizers and guilty perpetrators), and whistle-blowers.
Our model is defined in the following way. We consider an organization consisting of a number of employees who, with respect to the corrupt behavior, are initially subdivided into innocents and corruptors. The corrupt behavior permeates through the organization by directed contacts of the corrupted with the innocents. Gulati and Puranam (2009) distinguish between the formal organization (i.e., the normative social system designed by managers) and the informal organization (i.e., the emergent pattern of social interactions within organizations), both of which simultaneously co-exist and jointly affect organizational performance. In this paper we have assumed that contacts only take place along the links of the formal organization, i.e., organization structure.
The contacts between the corrupted and the rest of the organization are governed by the following set of rules: (1) a corruptor contacts, i.e., attempts to influence an innocent, at a each timestep ; (2) whenever a corruptor contacts an innocent, the innocent could become corrupted with probability (3) if, after contacting an innocent, the innocent does not become a corruptor, the corruptor may either be remove from the organization and replaced by an innocent member due to the above-mentioned whistle-blowing process or spontaneously become innocent with probability 
In the above, the first rule models the tendency of corrupt individuals to justify their behavior by influencing others to do likewise. The second rule models the tendency of individuals to adopt a corrupt practice, particularly if it is in their personal interest. The third rule indirectly models the ethical culture of an organization. If the ethical culture of the organization is strong then the probability of a corruptor infecting the innocents should reduce with every failure to infect an innocent, and the corruptor should either realize that the ethical behavior is the best course, at least while he or she works for that organization, or is removed from the organizational by the whistle-blowing process
Our model for the organizational network currently takes as its point of departure the simplest version of organizational networks: a pure hierarchical organizational tree with branching ratio k and L levels of organizational hierarchy. The number of nodes (agents) in this network is given by
Furthermore the average degree of the network is obtained from
We note here that the above model of organizational network does not incorporate the informal social connections between members which may exist across the hierarchy. Indeed, the formal hierarchical network may be considered as a well-defined backbone on top of which an overlay social network could be superimposed using, for example, the network construction algorithms described in Dodds et al. (2003) . However, unlike the organizational hierarchy which is very well defined, it is rather difficult to map out the overlay social network among the members, and different choices may result in hugely different network structures. For this reason we will limit ourselves in the current study to investigating 
III. SIMULATION STUDIES
We performed Monte Carlo simulation studies of the afore-mentioned model on three synthetically generated organizational networks which were characterized by (k=3, L=7), (k=4, L=6) and (k=10, L=4). These networks were chosen such that the total number in the organization for all was roughly the same (i.e., around 1000) as well as having very similar average degree ( 2  k ), but with the network structure becoming less hierarchical and more flat as k was increased while L was decreased at the same time. In each simulation we assume that corruption starts from a single corrupted individual and then spreads in the organization due to direct contacts between corruptors and innocent members. Since the dynamics of corruption are stochastic, each such corruption spreading event was repeated over 100 Monte Carlo runs in order to obtain meaningful statistical averages. Furthermore, corruption would spread differently depending on the position of the initial corruptor node in the organization, and the results were also averaged over events starting from 10 different randomly chosen initial corruptor nodes.
In addition, in order to analyze the impact of the position of the initial corruptor in the organization on the spreading, we also performed an additional set of simulations where we specified the "rank", ℎ, of the initial corruptor (i.e., a node at the top of the organizational hierarchy has rank ℎ = 1, while a node at the bottom of the hierarchy has rank ℎ = ).
All simulations were performed until the number of corrupted individuals became stabilized around a stationary mean. At each timestep of the simulation each corrupted individual attempts to corrupt all other innocent individuals to whom it is connected via an organizational link. If the corrupted individual is successful in such a contact then the innocent individual becomes corrupted at that timestep, and will attempt to spread the corruption from the next timestep. On the other hand, if the corrupted individual is unsuccessful in its attempt, it may become innocent with probability  at the next timestep.
Finally if a corrupted individual attempts to corrupt a whistle-blower then it will be removed at that timestep and replaced by an innocent in the next timestep.
III.1 Critical Corruption threshold
In the first study we model corruption contagion across three organization structures that vary with regard to how tall or flat they are. We fix the value of delta equal to 1 and investigate how varying the corruption probability  impacts the final proportion of corrupted individuals. In Figure 1 we show how the final proportion of corrupted individuals in each organization changes as the corruption probability increases. Even though we have modeled an "independent interaction" model and not a "critical threshold" model, there is a critical corruption threshold below which corrupt behavior dies out due to unsuccessful contact with innocent nodes and is unable to permeate the organization. However, above this threshold the corruption becomes an epidemic and is able to spread in a significant proportion of the organization, with the final size increasing as corruption probability increases.
Figure 1 The final fraction of the corrupted individuals as a function of corruption
probability is shown for three organizational structures. - We have found that the value of the critical corruption threshold depends on the topology of the underlying organizational network along which corruption spreads, i.e., the organization structure. In particular, as can be seen from Figure 1 , the threshold is lowest (around 0.32) for the flattest organization structure (k=10, L=4) and increases with increasing organization hierarchy to around 0.38 for the moderately tall structure (k=4, L=6), and around 0.42 for the tallest structure (k=3, L=7). This result suggests that organizations with a flat hierarchy, such as professional service firms may be more susceptible to organizational corruption than organizations with taller structures, such as manufacturing firms. This finding seems to resonate with reality, going by the number of investment banking firms that have been indicted on corruption charges.
However, once the corruption takes off, the final size does not seem to show a systematic dependence on network hierarchy, and this is an aspect that we can investigate in future research. Although the flattest structure has the lowest corruption contagion threshold, it spreads at a lower rate than in the other two taller structures and at the end of the simulation has resulted in the corruption of approximately 58% of the workforce, as compared to approximately 65% for the tallest structure, and approximately 78% for the moderately tall structure. This finding could be explained by the fact that flatter structures result in looser coupling (Reichman 1993) and "compartmental insulation" (Goffman 1970: 78) and this acts as a barrier to the pervasion of the corrupt practice.
That organizations with moderately tall structures can get corrupted to a greater extent than those with very flat or very tall structures is a counter-intuitive result (the intuition would be that it would be lower) which can be investigated in future research.
III.2 Impact of "Bad Apple" location on corruption contagion organization structure (k=3, L=7) impacts the dynamics of spreading at two different corruption probabilities, =0.6 in Figure 2 , and =0.5 in Figure 3 In Figure 2 , the value of  which is much higher than the corruption probability threshold for this type of structure (i.e., around 0.42, from Figure 1 ), it seems that regardless of the location of the initial corruptor in the hierarchy, the corruption spreads rapidly through the organization and results in a large proportion of the organization's workforce getting corrupted. It can be seen from Figure 2 that the position of the initial corruptor in the organizational hierarchy can greatly impact the spreading of corruption. Specifically, we see that, as expected, corruption grows slower and "infects" a much smaller proportion of the organization when it starts from the bottom. However, for this particular value of , it appears that the differences between spread of corruption when the initial corruptor is at various levels of the hierarchy (apart from the lowest level), is not very marked. In Figure 3 , the value of is set at 0.5, i.e., closer to the corruption threshold (0.42) and the impact of the position of the initial corruptor on the dynamics is much more pronounced than that for =0.6 scenario. Firstly, as would be expected, a much smaller proportion of the organization's workforce is eventually corrupted in all seven conditions. However, despite this lower range compared to the =0.6 scenario, the differences between the seven conditions are much more marked. The difference between when the initial corruptor is at the lowest two levels of the hierarchy and the higher levels of the hierarchy is much greater than it was in the =0.6 scenario.
Taken together, Figures 2 and 3 , suggest that in tall organization structures, a bad apple at any hierarchical level other than the bottom-most will result in widespread corruption contagion regardless of the corruption probability of individual employees. Further, a reduction of 0.10 in the corruption probability results in a halving of the overall pervasion of the corruption contagion. This implies that in taller structures, e.g. manufacturing firms, recruitment and selection should not only focus strongly on hiring high-integrity individuals, but also take special care in this regard when hiring employees at levels other than the lowest level.
In order to compare the differential impact of hierarchy, we conduct a similar simulation study to Figure 2 but for the flattest rather than the tallest organization structure.
In Figure 4 , results are shown for the flattest structure (i.e., k=10, L=4) with =0.6. Once again, it can be seen that moving the initial corruptor from the bottom of the hierarchy to higher levels results in a very pronounced increase in both the speed of spreading and the final number of corrupted nodes. However, there is marked difference between the spread of corruption when the initial corruptor is at the lowest hierarchical level as compared to the higher three levels.
Comparing the spread of corruption for =0.6 between the tallest structure (Figure 2 ), and the flattest structure (Figure 4) we can see that in the latter case, the corruption does not permeate the organization to the same extent as in the former case. This reinforces our conclusion from Figure 1 that corruption spreads more slowly in flatter structures as compared to taller structures.
III.3 Impact of Whistle-blowers on Corruption Contagion
The impact of whistle-blowers on preventing widespread corruption in organizations is investigated via simulations performed for the network corresponding to (k=4, L=6), i.e., the moderately tall organization structure. For this study we randomly designate a proportion p of the individuals as whistle-blower and then simulate the resulting corruption dynamics following the same Monte Carlo method as described before. Figure 5 shows how increasing the proportion of whistle-blowers, at levels of 1%, 5%, 10% and 20% of the organization's workforce, impacts the final proportion of corrupted individuals. It can be seen that if the proportion of whistle-blowers is less than 5% then the impact of whistle-blowing is insignificant. However, once the number of whistle-blowers is increased above 5% the presence of such individuals could prevent widespread corruption altogether by shifting the value of the corruption threshold upwards.
In Figure 6 results are shown for the final proportion of corrupted individuals as a function of p, and with the corruption probability fixed at =0.6. Increasing the proportion of whistle-blowers initially results in a gradual decrease in the final size of corruption. However, it can be seen that there is phase transition (tipping) at around p=0.25, i.e., when a quarter of the organization members are whistle-blowers, above which we see a dramatic decrease in the final size of corruption. This is an interesting result as it indicates that there is a critical value for the proportion of whistle-blowers in the organization above which the action of such individuals can prevent widespread corruption.
II.3 Implications for practice.
Firstly, it seems that when corruption probability is high, then regardless of the type of organization structure, the corruption will permeate the entire organization. This underscores the importance of testing prior to selection. In terms of selection testing, researchers have found that unethical behaviors can be predicted both from specific integrity or honesty tests (Bernardin & Cooke 1993; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993) and from general personality instruments (Lee, Ashton, & de Vries, 2005) . This is even more important for organizations with flatter structures, such as professional service organizations (e.g., lawyers, accountants, consultants, investment bankers), because the corruption probability threshold for these organizations is lower than it is for organizations with taller structures.
Unfortunately, real-life evidence suggests that professional service organizations may not be cognizant of this risk, and their focus on business objectives rather than on their professional code of conduct could increase their likelihood of being corrupted to above the critical threshold, with disastrous consequences. The obvious examples in this regard are the investment banking firms (e.g., Lehman Brothers) in which relentless focus on short-term business results and bonuses resulted in corruption permeating the entire organization and eventually resulted in their demise.
Secondly, the hierarchical level at which the bad apples are located has significant impact on the corruption spreading dynamics. As one would expect, the higher the level at which the bad apples are located, the faster and wider the spread of corruption in the organization. However, if the organization is able to hire employees who are less likely to succumb to corrupt influences, then the differential impact of hierarchical level is even more pronounced, i.e., junior-level bad apples have a much lower impact on corruption spreading dynamics than senior-level bad apples. This implies that the testing of senior-level job applicants with regard to ethics should be conducted more rigorously than for junior-level job applicants. However, once again it seems that in real-life the opposite is true, and junior-level positions (e.g., sales staff in retail organizations, or tellers in consumer banking) are subjected to greater scrutiny on ethics than senior-level positions (e.g., sales managers, bank branch managers). Also, the socialization processes for junior employees (e.g., management trainees)
is usually far more formal, rigorous and comprehensive than for senior employees. Therefore if a senior employee is carrying a "corruption virus" with him or her, the lack of a rigorous socialization process will allow the virus to be retained and it could initiate a corruption contagion in the future.
Thirdly, the presence of potential whistle-blowers is an important antidote to corruption spreading. Even if 5% of the workforce are potential whistle-blowers then the chances of the corruption being inhibited are very high, and if this number can be raised to around 25%, then the impact of bad apples on corruption spreading will be negligible. Thus our simulations provide some indication of what would be a reasonable target to achieve in terms of fostering whistle-blowers in an organization. The lower bound, i.e., 5% is not an impossibly tall order for an organization to shoot for and if organizations create a climate conducive to whistleblowing then at least the lower bound could be achieved.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our paper bridges two important research streams, organizational corruption and social contagion. With regard to organizational corruption research, we complement the rich existing conceptual work by formally modeling corruption contagion. We have quantitatively depicted the time-evolution of corruption across organizations with different organization structures and estimated the critical thresholds at which the corruption would irrevocably contaminate the organization and the proportion of whistle-blowers needed to inhibit the spread of corruption. As mentioned earlier, this is one of the few attempts to study the role of organization structure in influencing ethical actions. Our paper also contributes to the literature on social contagion, by modeling intra-organizational contagion across individuals, an area that has been relatively neglected. Further, we are not aware of other social contagion studies that have included a parameter that impedes the contagion, such as the potential whistle-blowers in our study.
One of the benefits of formal modeling is unanticipated implications (Adner et al.
2009), and we plan to further investigate some of the intriguing results in this paper, in particular, the impact of taller versus flatter structures on corruption spreading dynamics.
Also, in organizations there are power differentials among individuals in a dyad, and power asymmetry would influence the corruption probability. This means that it would be easier for a superior to influence a subordinate to adopt a corrupt practice, than it would be for a subordinate to influence a superior, or even a peer. In terms of our simulation studies, this implies that rather than have a fixed corruption probability,we could have a range of corruption probabilities which reflect power asymmetries.
Our paper is generative in terms of future research. For instance, now that we have a ball-park estimate of the critical threshold of "corruption probability" of individuals, we could conduct studies using threshold models rather than Poisson models. The base-rate "corruption probability" of individuals itself could be estimated and triangulated through laboratory experiments. This lab base rate could then be adjusted to account for the effect of factors like the organization's climate for ethics (Dickson, Smith, Grojean, & Ehrhart, 2001) or ethical work climate (Victor & Cullen 1988) .
In this paper, we have varied the corruption probability and considered the evolution of the corruption contagion emanating from a single bad apple. In future work, we could keep the corruption probability fixed at a low value, and vary the number of bad apples, who could be randomly distributed through the organization to investigate the contagion dynamics. This approach would reflect the situation wherein although the majority of the employees are high in integrity, there are some bad apples who should have been rejected but have been hired.
Considering the interesting results with regard to organization structure, i.e., that the compartmentalization emanating from flatter structures results in slower spreading and lower overall contamination, we could model contagion across other underlying network structures. are not only considered representative of organization structure (where the top management team is the core, and the rest of the organization is the periphery) but also rife in structural holes, and modeling corruption contagion over this network structure might prove insightful.
We could also consider the impact of power asymmetries and other situational factors on the effectiveness of whistle-blowing. Combining the results of our simulations, since corruption contagion is more inimical at senior levels, and presence of a small number of whistle-blowers is an effective antidote, we could explore the impact of varying the hierarchical level location of the whistle-blowers in future research, instead of simply taking a random sample as we have done here.
